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ABSTRACT 
Since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Navy has continued to chart a 
path relying on a maritime strategy enacted in 1986, which successfully drove all aspects 
of naval warfare, from training to procurement and deployment during the Cold War. 
Several Policy documents have emerged since 1991 attempting to set new strategic 
pursuits for the Navy, but none have had the cohesive vision that the Cold War strategy 
employed for its era. The literature on national security strategy lays out the theory of 
delegation and execution in the strategic process – from formulating grand strategy down 
to operational tactics – but supporting literature on organizational models offers 
arguments that question the rationality of national strategy decisions.  The ways strategy 
develops remain unclear, raising questions about the overall purpose of naval forces and 
the policies required to support a new strategy.  This thesis will examine the strategic 
disconnect and confusion the United States Navy is experiencing in searching for a new 
Maritime strategy through the lenses of the organizational behavior and bureaucratic 
politics models.  This will lead to a better understanding of the military’s internal 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE  
 
Since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Navy has continued to chart a 
path relying on a maritime strategy enacted in 1986,1 which successfully drove all aspects 
of naval warfare, from training to procurement and deployment during the Cold War.  
The literature on national security strategy lays out the theory of delegation and execution 
in the strategic process – from formulating grand strategy down to operational tactics – 
but supporting literature on organizational models offers arguments that question the 
rationality of national strategy decisions.  This thesis will examine the strategic 
disconnect and confusion the United States Navy is experiencing in searching for a new 
Maritime strategy through the lenses of the organizational behavior and bureaucratic 
politics models.  This will lead to a better understanding of the military’s internal 




Several policy documents have emerged since 1991 attempting to set new 
strategic pursuits for the Navy, but none have had the cohesive vision that the Cold War 
strategy employed for its era.2  In the last three years, the White House and military 
leaders have produced several new strategy documents laying the foundation for national 
security, defense and military strategy.3  The literature on national security strategy 
                                                 
1 Adm. James D. Watkins, “The Maritime Strategy,” Gen. P. X. Kelley and Maj. Hugh O’Donnell. 
“Amphibious Warfare Strategy,” John P. Lehman, Jr. “The 600-Ship Navy.” United States Naval Institute 
Proceedings: The Maritime Strategy Supplement, (January 1986). 
2 Naval War College Newport Papers 27: U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s, ed. John B. Hattendorf 
(Newport, RI: Naval War College, September 2006). 
3 Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the 
United States of America (Washington D.C.: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, [2004]); Donald Rumsfeld, 
Secretary of Defense, National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington D.C.: Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, [March 2005]); George W. Bush, President of the United States of America, 
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington D.C.: The White House, 
[March 16, 2006]). 
2 
outlines how the process of delegation and execution is supposed to work but supporting 
literature on organizational behavior and bureaucratic politics offers arguments that 
question the rationality of national strategy decisions.  In its search for a new Maritime 
Strategy, the Navy appears to be exhibiting signs of strategic confusion or at least a 
tangential disconnect from the rational process.4  Before developing the maritime 
strategy, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Michael Mullen, publicized his 
ideal 313 ship fleet, the 30-year procurement plan to get there,5 and signed a Naval 
Operations Concept (NOC), “guided by national strategy” to prescribe how the “Navy-
Marine Corps team will contribute to the defense of our nation.”6  Rationally, the 
Maritime Strategy should drive the force structure of the Navy; here the force structure is 
set before the creation of strategy.  This disconnect will affect not only the composition 
of forces assigned to the Middle East, but also the scope of their influence in an already 
tumultuous region.  To explore this disconnect from the literature on national security 
strategy, the models – organizational behavior and bureaucratic politics – will be used to 
analyze the specifics of the internal processes within the Navy which are producing the 
new Maritime Strategy.  
 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1. Background  
 
Since the creation of the Navy in the United States Constitution,7 its role in 
national security and military strategy has been debated. Post World War II saw a focus 
on antisubmarine warfare and the Navy’s role in nuclear strike warfare.  Throughout the 
early stages of the Cold War limited war and nuclear deterrence shaped the strategic 
                                                 
4 The rational actor or realist school of thought depicts decisions made by “calculating costs and 
benefits of alternative courses of action and choosing the action that maximizes their utility.”  See Graham 
Allison and Philip Zelikow, “Model I: The Rational Actor,” Essence of Decision, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: 
Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 1999), 13-75.   
5 Navy Office of Information, "Developing a New Maritime Strategy," Department of the Navy, 
http://www.jhuapl.edu/maritimestrategy/library/12sepMarStratRL.pdf (accessed February 25, 2007). 
6 U.S. Navy, Naval Operations Concept 2006 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 2006), 
http://www.mcwl.usmc.mil (accessed February 25, 2007). Signed by M. Mullen and M. Hagee, 1.  
7 See US Const, Art I, § 8. “The Congress shall have power…To provide and maintain a Navy.” 
3 
debate.  By the 1970s, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations, outlined 
the “Four Missions of the Navy” as strategic deterrence, sea control, power projection, 
and peacetime presence.8  By the 1980s, maritime strategy had come to be the main focus 
of President Ronald Reagan’s first Secretary of the Navy, John F. Lehman, Jr. as he 
sought support for his 600-ship fleet.  By the time his vision was fleshed out and released 
to the public as a supplement to the January 1986 issue of United States Naval Institute 
Proceeds, maritime strategy “was presented by the Navy as only one – albeit a vital – 
component of the national military strategy…The Navy Department and the fleet were 
now speaking with one sophisticated voice to – and increasingly for – the nation and its 
allies.”9  The strategy was heavily offensive oriented, especially towards open ocean blue 
water engagements with the Soviet Union.  The major strategic objectives were:  
• To prevent the seas from becoming a hostile medium of attack against 
the United States and its allies.   
• To ensure that we have unimpeded use of our ocean lifelines to our 
allies, our forward-deployed forces, our energy and mineral resources, 
and our trading partners.   
• To be able to project force in support of national security objectives 
and to support combat ashore, should deterrence fail.10  
Lehman was the Alfred Thayer Mahan of the late twentieth century and the carrier was 
the centerpiece of his forward deployed, global strategy.  Carrier aviation would be 
instrumental as a nuclear deterrent force against the Soviet Union.  Forward deployed 
forces would sail out to meet the enemy in its backyard instead of creating a defensive 
moat around the U.S. mainland.  Regional conflicts and more limited wars would also be 
dealt with through the use of carrier strikes. 
 Crisis response to limited wars and maintaining a peacetime overseas presence in 
areas such as the Persian Gulf became the primary focus for the U.S. Navy from the time 
of Lehman’s “Maritime Strategy” until Operation Desert Storm in 1991.  Ensuring 
freedom of the seas was the principle focus of Operation Earnest Will (1987-1988) 
during which U.S. Navy Warships escorted merchant shipping safely through the Persian 
                                                 
8 John B. Hattendorf, Naval War College Newport Papers 19: The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s 
Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986 , (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2004), 7-10.  
9 Ibid., 195. 
10 Lehman, The 600-Ship Navy, 36. 
4 
Gulf.11  Following the Iran-Iraq War, forward deployed U.S. warships had become a 
fixture in the region remaining to ensure regional stability.   
 The Gulf War of 1991 saw a tremendous build up of air, land, and sea power of 
the United States and its allies in order to remove Iraq from Kuwait.  Naval planners 
argued over how best to utilize their assets.  As retired Marine Lieutenant General 
Bernard E. Trainor explains, the U.S. Navy and Air Force held polarizing views on the 
employment of air power.  “[T]he Air Force thought in terms of campaigns, extended air 
operations to defeat an adversary.”  Achieving victory in a massive conventional conflict 
was not part of the Navy’s aviation strategy.  “Before the Gulf [War], Navy Planners had, 
in effect, two models of conflict: the short, one-day attacks off the coast of Libya or an 
all-out war with the Soviet Union.”12         
 
2. Survey of Prior Work on the Subject 
 
Since the Gulf War in 1991, debate at the naval strategic level has involved two 
main naval missions: forward presence and operations in the littoral vs. blue water.  What 
the current literature lacks is a comprehensive analysis of the specifics of the internal 
processes within the Navy which will result in an output in the form of a new Maritime 
Strategy today.  In the era of globalization states such as Germany, Japan, and the former 
Soviet Union, that have traditionally maintained large navies, have lost interest in 
maritime power as a tool to exert influence and secure objectives.  Large merchant fleets 
are now contracted out instead of manned by host flags and seamen.  China’s merchant 
fleet remains the major exception; however, it shows little sign of trying to compete for 
near-peer status militarily with the United States.  With so many countries relying on the 
efficiency of merchant sea traffic to transport exports, the United States remains the lead 
protector of the international sea lanes, a presence which is particularly heavy in the 
Persian Gulf.  Without an influential global force capable of maintaining security and 
ensuring open sea lanes, chaos and destruction would follow.  Pirating and sinking 
                                                 
11 U.S. Department of the Navy, Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year1991, (Arlington, VA: Navy 
Internal Relations Activity, 1990), 10.  
12 Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The General’s War: The Inside Story of the 
Conflict in the Gulf, (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 97. 
5 
merchant traffic would be counterproductive to global economic stability.  Fishing 
grounds could potentially be ruined.  Dispersed cargo could become a hazard to 
navigation, delaying and disrupting further merchant traffic.13   
With so many states economically and politically interconnected, why is the 
United States responsible for maintaining the bulk of the balance?  This question 
becomes an antithesis to the usefulness of naval forces.  Professing no imperial 
intentions14 and possessing a stable economic and industrial base, the United States has 
invested more capital in the construction, training, and support of a naval force than the 
next nine closest nations.  Admiral William Owens argues that “the fleet was never 
forced to fight the open-ocean battles the Navy had been preparing for during the 
preceding twenty years.”15  Having trained and prepared for a Cold War battle that never 
occurred, the Navy, is once again, forced to reinvent itself, or at least, find new 
justification for the blue water assets in its inventory.  In fact the last significant 
confrontation between surface combatants came in 1988 and even that was hardly a 
challenge for U.S. forces.16 
With a new focus needed to justify its forces following the first Gulf War and 
throughout the 1990s, the Navy branched out into the littoral environment to rededicate 
itself to the long-standing naval mission of forward presence.  With no real emerging 
near-peer threat to open ocean dominance, the Navy transitioned into a search for littoral 
dominance.  This strategy was outlined in the publication of “…From the Sea” and 
“Forward…From the Sea.”17  Continuing to transform its expeditionary force, the Navy 
                                                 
13  Frank Uhlig, Jr., "Fighting at and from the Sea: A Second Opinion," Naval War College Review  
56, no. 2 (Spring 2003), 48-49. 
14 President George W. Bush stated, “We're not an imperial power, as nations such as Japan and 
Germany can attest. We're a liberating power, as nations in Europe and Asia can attest as well.” See: 
“Transcript of Bush's Remarks on Iraq: 'We Will Finish the Work of the Fallen',” New York Times, April 
14, 2004,  Late Edition (east Coast),  http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu (accessed November 13, 
2007).  
15  As quoted in Edward Rhodes, "'...from the Sea' and Back again: Naval Power in the Second 
American Century," Naval War College Review 52, no. 2 (Spring 1999), 3. 
16 For a discussion of Operation PRAYING MANTIS and other surface engagements see: K.J. Hagan 
and Michael McMaster, “The Demise of the Maritime Strategy and the Search for a Replacement 1984-
2006,” a paper prepared for delivery at the Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Conference 31 January 2006.  
17 Sean O’Keefe, Frank B. Kelso, and C.E. Mundy, Jr., “…From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service 
for the 21st Century,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 118, no. 11 (November 1992) , 93-96; J.M. Boorda, 
John H. Dalton, Carl E. Mundy, Jr., “Forward…From the Sea,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings 
120, no. 12 (December 1994). 
6 
would be called upon to shift their focus from open ocean operations, to operations 
originating at sea and projecting power inland.18  The new strategic objective was to 
support global regional stability, promote confidence in democracies, and help fledgling 
states orient themselves in the international arena.  The goal was to shape the battle space 
through precision strikes, amphibious assaults, and maintaining open sea lanes of 
communication to either deter conflict or decisively end small regional conflicts quickly 
before they get out of hand.  Operation Vigilant Warrior (1995) demonstrated U.S. 
resolve by stationing a carrier battle group in the Red Sea, and an amphibious ready 
group off the coast of Kuwait, in response to Iraqi threats.19  Additionally, the Fifth Fleet 
Command was activated by the United States in July 1995 to keep the Persian Gulf 
chokepoints and sea lanes of communication open and to serve as a primary contingency 
force for the combatant commander.20  The Navy chose the forward presence mission to 
demonstrate its relevance and sought missions of value to national security.  
Two arguments exist against the littoral, forward-deployed strategy.21  One, the 
Navy is not the only service which can project forward presence.  If a military presence is 
required to quell a regional conflict, sufficient warnings and indicators will enable the 
Army to establish a presence prior to combat operations.  Some argue that land power has 
more deterrent value.  “Because deterrence is based on perception and because most 
potential U.S. adversaries are primarily land powers, a U.S. land power presence may be 
the most effective deterrent.”22  Naval forces providing sea basing would be of little or no 
consequence in shaping the battle space.  The Air Force argues that air power can be 
projected through bomber strikes more cheaply than the continuous presence of carrier 
battle groups and they can do it utilizing aircraft originating stateside or staged from 
allied bases around the world.  The first Gulf War and the campaign in Kosovo illustrate 
                                                 
18 O’Keefe, Kelso, Mundy, ...from the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century, 93-96.  
19 U.S. Department of the Navy, 1995 Posture Statement, The Navy Marine Corps Team, 10. 
20 United States Central Command, Fifth Fleet, “History,” 
http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/history/index.html,  Department of the Navy, (accessed 26 October 2007). 
21 Daniel Gouré, “The Tyranny of Forward Presence,” Naval War College Review, 54, no. 3 (Summer 
2001); Rhodes, '...from the Sea' and Back again: Naval Power in the Second American Century. 
22 Maj. Gen. Joseph G. Garrett III, USA, “Memorandum for Deputy Director, Strategy and Policy, J-5, 
Subject: Service Input for the Joint Strategy Review (JSR),” U.S. Army, 3 September 1996, 2. 
7 
the fact that if land bases are required, they will be “found or seized.”23  Expeditionary 
forces capable of deploying quickly in response to (or to prevent) crises has become the 
goal of all military branches.  The Navy responds to these points of view by looking at a 
scenario in which the cost of access outweighs the risk, both politically and militarily; 
here the only approach left is via the sea.24       
The second argument against the littoral strategy lies in the fact that the Navy has 
failed to articulate precisely what the force make up should be to attain full spectrum 
dominance inside twelve miles from land.  In response to events on the ground, the Navy 
invariably deploys traditional carrier battle and expeditionary strike groups, but this 
repackaging of old Cold War units leaves unaddressed the specific force needed to 
succeed in the littorals.25  The Navy has made small steps to this end, with plans to 
purchase the littoral combat ship (LCS) – of which only one has been commissioned and 
is far from deployment ready26 – and the creation of a riverine force to focus on the 
‘brown water.’  However, both of these units are unproven and untested; their long term 
effectiveness has yet to be determined.   
Forward presence operations (including both exercises and combat operations) 
have been conducted to shape the battle space prior to conflict or to create favorable 
circumstances for the U.S. and its allies.  The Navy believes, that ships are designed to 
put to sea, so in pursuing national interests in regions around the world, sending the Navy 
makes the most sense.  Naval forces are also the ideal platform for joint operations in the 
age of preemptive warfare.27  However, in order to maintain even the smallest presence 
overseas, the Navy needs a larger force to meet its demands.  “For every ship deployed, 
the U.S. Navy requires between three and five more in rotation: steaming to or from the 
deployment area; in overhaul; in port for leave and repair; and ‘working up’ in local 
training exercises.”28  Assigning multiple crews to one ship for training purposes and 
                                                 
23 Gouré, The Tyranny of Forward Presence, 17. 
24 Roger W. Barnett, “Naval Power for a New American Century,” Naval War College Review, 55, 
no. 1 (Winter 2002), 51. 
25 Rhodes, '...from the Sea' and Back again: Naval Power in the Second American Century, 15.  
26 Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program – Background and Issues for 
Congress, RL33741, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 18 July 2007). 
27 As outlined in the National Security Strategy 2006 and National Defense Strategy 2005.  
28 Gouré, The Tyranny of Forward Presence, 18. 
8 
leaving a ship forward deployed while swapping crews (so that the ship’s on-station time 
is lengthened) are concepts that have been attempted to alleviate some of the budgetary 
issues but they may not go far enough.  “It is no secret that our current resources of 
[276]29 ships are fully deployed and in many cases stretched thin to meet the growing 
national security demands.”30  It follows, then, that despite using forward presence to 
justify its desired force structure, a concentration on the littoral environment weakens the 
single largest advantage the Navy brings to the projection of national interests in its 
unrivaled supremacy of the blue water arena.   
 
3. Major Debates and Approaches to the Issue 
 
Where is the Navy headed now?  Can we predict its future course? The manner in 
which strategy develops remains unclear, raising questions about the overall purpose of 
naval forces and the policies required to support a new strategy.  Today, several schools 
of thought exist on the processes utilized to predict and chart the implementation of 
policy and strategy.  A plethora of literature exists on the process of delegation and 
execution of policy.  The organizational behavior and bureaucratic politics models, two 
major theories dealing with the prediction and explanation of policy outputs, question the 
traditional rational actor paradigm and are purported to be better at explaining the 
organizational process.31  These models have been used to analyze and predict foreign 
policy decisions over the years.  Scholarly experts argue that they are simultaneously 
useful and ineffective in dissecting the internal decision processes within government 
bureaucracies. 
                                                 
 29 The Navy currently has a deployable battle force of 276 ships, a significant drop from the quoted 
(citation below) 316 ships in 2000.  Of that number 1/3 are on deployment, and 42% are underway. For the 
latest data see: www.navy.mil. 
 30 House Armed Services committee on Ship Building, Statement of Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Vice 
Admiral, U.S. Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Resources Warfare Requirements and Assessments, 
before the Subcommittee on Procurement, 106 Cong., 1st sess., 29 February 2000. 
 31  Graham Allison and Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and some Policy 
Implications," World Politics 24, Supplement: Theory and Policy in International Relations (Spring 1972),  
40-79.; Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Addison-
Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 1999), 416.; I.M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucracies, and Foreign 
Policy. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972); Morton H. Halperin and Prescilla A. Clapp, 
Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2006), 400. 
9 
Organizational behavior theory, drawn on by Graham Allison, proposes several 
propositions regarding the decisions leaders are likely to make.  For his paradigm, 
Allison treats government action as the result of organizational routines and outputs.  
When confronted with a problem, organizational leaders will not look at it as a whole, but 
will break it down and allocate it according to pre-established organizational lines.32  
Organizations are also prone to bounded rationality in their adherence to standard 
operating procedures and routines when taking action.33  Such routines do not lend 
themselves easily to innovation or flexibility.34  When action is recommended or taken it 
will often reflect the specific organizational priorities.  Leaders gravitate towards 
solutions that limit short-term uncertainty; direct change can affect organizational outputs 
over time, but immediate responses to emerging crises make this rare.35  The overall goal 
of an organization is to increase its sphere of influence so that it can continue pursuing its 
own objectives.  The U.S. military is an example of a strong organizational culture.36       
Bureaucratic politics theory, as proposed by Allison and Morton Halperin, treats 
the organizational output as the result of compromise and negotiation between competing 
organizations and their interests.37  Even if they agree on the objective, leaders differ in 
how to achieve it because of such factors as organizational perspective, personal interests, 
and background.38  “Where you stand depends on where you sit.”39  Somewhere at the 
top is a leader exercising control over a collection of organizations, but even he must get 
those under him to accede to a consensus or risk having his order misinterpreted or 
ignored.  When presenting options to the top echelon of leaders, organizations within the 
bureaucracy find it easier to defeat the agendas of others than to pass their own.40  In the 
                                                 
32 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 166.  
33 Ibid., 178.  
34 Ibid., 180.  
35 Ibid., 181-82; David A. Welch, "The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: 
Retrospect and Prospect," International Security 17, no. 2 (Autumn, 1992), 120. 
36 James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy. (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 164. 
37 Halperin and Clapp, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 296-97; Allison and Halperin, 
Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and some Policy Implications, 43.  
38 Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 305-06. 
39 Ibid., 307.  
40 Robert J. Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique," Policy Sciences 4 
(1972), 470. 
10 
absence of a consensus within the inner circle opponents may take advantage of these 
disagreements to promote what they feel is the right course of action.41  The only way for 
an organization to succeed is to convince others that the goals and objectives of the 
organization really mirror their respective agendas. 
Currently, there is much debate regarding the effectiveness of these two theories.  
One of the drawbacks to the organizational model is its absence at the moment of 
decision.  By focusing on the routines that restrict the formation of options, the 
organizational model explains how the rational decision making process becomes 
derailed (the means), but not how actual decisions are made (the ends).42    In seeing 
standard operating procedures as a rigid framework constraining the decision making 
outputs, military history is full of examples of leaders who deviated from their carefully 
scripted plans to achieve victorious results.43  “Routines are not a helpful analytical 
category, because they cannot be said to have the uniform characteristics or pervasive and 
systematic effects upon which to build powerful theories of state behavior.”44          
Additionally, the bureaucratic politics paradigm has been criticized for not 
advancing beyond a description of the process, and not offering “positive theories of 
action.”45  It is hard to test bureaucratic theories because of the “relationship between a 
player’s bureaucratic position and his or her preferences.”46  It is unclear how much they 
take into account the players perceptions, rather than placing more emphasis on the 
position itself.47  If the perceptions of the individual contribute largely in the decision 
making process, then how important is the bureaucratic process?  Additionally, in this 
system of comprise through “hauling and pulling,” bureaucratic players know going into 
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the game that the output will require negotiation, so they do not request what their true 
organizational interests presume.  Instead, they will attempt to anticipate the reaction of 
other organizations and present an option that has broader appeal.48 
 
4. Major Questions and Argument 
 
What has followed since the Cold War has been a collection of strategies and 
ideas that lay the foundation for transformation but do not deliver it completely.  Is this a 
result of its organizational history and can the models prescribed here validate the process 
the Navy is going through?  Will the United States continue pursuing the age old precept 
of forward presence?  What is certain is that the security environment in which naval 
forces will operate in the twenty-first century has yet to play out as a result of 
globalization.  A new maritime strategy will need to focus on an overarching logic of 
how the seas will be used to secure United States national interests.  In getting to this 
point the Navy will be forced to make hard concessions, yet the theories suggest the Navy 
will avoid drastic transformation.  By analyzing the process through the lenses of the 
organizational and bureaucratic models, this thesis hopes to not only examine their 
usefulness in predicting outputs, but also to explain the strategic disconnect and 
confusion in the Navy’s internal process.  The existing literature spells out clearly where 
the Navy came from and how it got here, but falls short of providing a clear prescription 
for where it is going over the next twenty years.  Can the Navy develop a strategy more 
specific than go wherever the country requires; do whatever is necessary; and stay as long 
as it takes? 
 
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
 
This thesis will utilize the United States Navy’s path in its revision of the 
Maritime Strategy as a case study with which to examine the two organizational models: 
organizational behavior and bureaucratic politics.  One case will be used to examine both 
models.  These models have been traditionally used to examine foreign policy and grand 
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strategy outputs.  In order to limit the scope of this thesis, only two naval communities 
will be examined.  Here, each model will be applied to the naval aviation and surface 
communities to determine its validity in a smaller, more micro case study, with the 
assumption that, despite different areas of expertise and operations the submarine and 
special warfare communities will act along similar lines.  The thesis will first attempt to 
determine the Navy’s internal process of evaluating and implementing a new strategy.  
Once predictions are made, the author will examine how the Navy is actually responding 
and arriving at the output level.  After that, the two results will be examined to determine 
whether they correlate with the organization behavior and/or bureaucratic politics 




II. THE TWO MODELS: PREDICTIONS 
A. FROM GRAND NATIONAL STRATEGY TO MARITIME STRATEGY 
 
Before beginning to examine the process of creating and executing strategy, one 
must define grand strategy.  Harry Yarger describes strategy as “the calculation of 
objectives, concepts, and resources within acceptable bounds of risk to create more 
favorable outcomes than might otherwise exist by chance or at the hands of others. [It is] 
a coherent blueprint to bridge the gap between the realities of today and a desired 
future.”49  Since September 11, 2001 the national bureaucracies and the military have 
been flooded with a plethora of new security strategies with which to “bridge the gap.”  
From the top down, the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and 
National Military Strategy have been rewritten to reflect globalization and the war on 
terrorism in the national security environment.  For this thesis, grand strategy will refer 
to the strategic vision outlined in these documents.   
A quick review of the objectives and concepts delineated from these strategic 
documents include several common themes.  The National Security Strategy calls for 
“strengthen[ing] alliances to defeat global terrorism; ...work[ing] with others to defuse 
regional conflicts; ignit[ing] a new era of global economic growth through free markets 
and trade; [and] transform[ing] America’s national security institutions to meet the 
challenges…of the 21st century.”50  The Secretary of Defense reiterated the National 
Security proclamation that “America is a nation at war,”51 with the same strategic 
objectives.  Elaborating on how the Department of Defense will accomplish those 
objectives, the secretary places emphasis on alliances, creating hard targets through 
“dissuad[ing] adversaries [and] deter[ring] aggression,”52 “operating from the global 
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commons,”53 and “continuous defense transformation.”54  Following the strategic 
guidance further down the chain of command the National Military Strategy “provides 
focus for military activities by defining a set of interrelated military objectives and joint 
operating concepts from which the Service Chiefs and combatant commanders identify 
desired capabilities and against which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assesses 
risk.”55  By developing a new maritime strategy the Navy is attempting to build its 
capacity at the point of delivery which will allow its complex organization to structure in 
an appropriate manner the operational outputs needed to meet the demands of the 
national security environment.  The organizational behavior and bureaucratic politics 
models can be used to deconstruct the process of creating and executing the maritime 
strategy for the United States Navy.  Using the two models as a frame of reference, what 
should the Navy’s internal storyline be and what should its maritime strategy process 
look like? 
 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 
 
Organizational behavior predicts that the Navy will respond with a maritime 
strategy output based on its organizational capabilities, procedures and interests.  
Organizational theory, drawn on by Graham Allison, proposes several propositions 
regarding the decisions leaders are likely to make.  For this paper, naval action (i.e. the 
maritime strategy) will be treated as the result of organizational routines and outputs.  
When confronted with the problem of developing a new maritime strategy, naval leaders 
do not look at it as a whole, but break it down and allocate it according to pre-established 
organizational lines.56  These lines will be split along the warfare communities for 
purposes of this analysis.  The inputs of the surface and aviation communities will 
constitute the principal agents within the Navy for researching the problem of strategy  
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development.  Each community of the Navy has its own organizational missions, 
imbedded organizational routines, and culture with which to tackle the maritime strategy 
problems within its purview.       
To succinctly define their intent, both the commanders of the Atlantic surface and 
air forces of the Navy profess a mission statement.  “The mission of Commander, Naval 
Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet is to provide combat ready ships to the fleet; and 
supply those ships and supporting commands with the leadership, manpower, equipment, 
maintenance, training, and material needed to achieve operational excellence and conduct 
prompt, sustained combat operations at sea to ensure victory.”57  With this statement, the 
commander of the surface forces seeks to dominate sea power with conventional surface 
assets.  His goals, as laid out in the organizational mission, are his interpretation of orders 
from higher command to operate in the surface arena.   
On the other hand, the Commander, Naval Air Forces, Atlantic Fleet, lays out his 
mission statement: “Man, train, equip and maintain a naval air force that is immediately 
employable, forward deployed and engaged.  We support the Fleet and Unified 
Commanders by delivering the right force with the right readiness at the right time at 
reduced cost......today and in the future….Our core competency is the projection of 
combat power, whether from a flight deck or a forward base.”58  His purview includes all 
aspects of aviation and flight related matters.  The two communities have similar mission 
statements in the pursuit of dominance of their respective specialties, but are part of the 
larger Navy organization, which has its own institutional goals and direction from the 
National Command Authority.  The organizational actors make decisions based on their 
operational charters and missions.  As we work our way down the organizational chain, 
all the way from the President to operational commanders, “organizations interpret 
mandates into their own terms.  This is especially true when the broad goals conflict or 
offer little operational guidance.”59        
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In its adherence to standard operating procedures and routines the Navy is also 
prone to bounded rationality when taking action.60  Shipboard life lends itself to strict 
standard operating procedures (SOP) in order to accomplish routine operational tasks.  In 
the surface Navy every officer-of-the-deck (OOD) or engineering-officer-of-the-watch 
(EOOW) is extremely familiar with checklists.  Checklists drive every special evolution, 
from lighting off boilers, starting gas turbine engines, getting ships underway, to 
replenishments at sea.  In the aviation community there are routines established for the 
landing and taking off of aircraft from carriers.  Such routines do not lend themselves 
easily to innovation or flexibility.61  SOPs exist to carry out rules and processes designed 
by higher authorities.  The organization is much more concerned with the "how" of a task 
than with the "what" because the mission is vague and lacking a definitive objective.  
Checking every box along the way is as important as reaching a defined objective.  Crises 
often do not conform to the standard routines for which plans exist, creating an 
environment which “does not constitute far sighted, flexible adaptation to ‘the issue’”62 
of maritime strategy. When action is recommended or taken it will often reflect specific 
organizational priorities.  When leaders are trained in this environment, this type of 
decision making prevents creative and strategic thinking.  To develop strategy, leaders 
will gravitate towards solutions that limit short-term uncertainty; direct change can affect 
organizational outputs over time, but immediate responses to emerging crisis make this 
rare.63         
The overall goal of the organization is to increase its sphere of influence so that 
they can continue pursuing their own objectives.  The U.S. military, and in the case of 
this paper, the Navy, is an example of a strong organizational culture.64  In order to 
operate the ships and aircraft necessary to perform their missions, each community seeks 
to wield the most influence in organizational decisions, such as creating a maritime 
strategy.  Along these lines, naval surface forces will promote traditional combatants 
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(cruisers and destroyers or CRUDES) and naval aviators will push for the continued 
central role of the aircraft carrier to fulfill the maritime strategy.  As participants in the 
strategy process, surface and aviation leaders will analyze proposals with the idea of how 
it will impact their respective community’s ability to carry out their missions.  “In one 
way or another, the pursuit of influence itself is felt to be in the [Navy’s] interest.”65  
According to Halperin’s view of the model, each community will be staffed with career 
officers who share a common vision of their organizational essence.66  As a part of the 
larger naval organization, surface and aviation forces will compete to define their 
singular essence in the maritime strategy.   
The role of carriers and conventional combatants is not new to the naval 
organizational strategy debate.  The U.S. fleet surviving the December 7, 1941, attack did 
not have the ideal Mahanian composition that naval officers wanted to wage their 
campaign.  The age of Mahan had dictated that the battle group should revolve around 
battleships; all assets protected the big guns whatever the cost.  What staff planners found 
following Perl Harbor was a force largely composed of cruisers, submarines and three 
carriers.  The Navy, following Mahan’s theory of “control the enemy’s navy and so 
control the sea,” had to adapt and develop its naval strategy around the surviving assets.  
Task forces were reorganized around a carrier and ordered to commence a war of attrition 
in the tradition of George Washington and Nathaniel Greene.  Unproven as a major 
offensive weapon, the carrier replaced surface fire superiority in the Mahanian tradition.  
When attached to a carrier task force, the battleship concentrated on keeping Japanese 
battleships at bay, thereby protecting the carriers’ vulnerable flight decks.  “Thus the 
battle fleet, which had been the center of navy thinking and planning for over thirty years, 
quietly disappeared.”67  
Long after World War II, the Navy continued to debate which forces best 
controlled the sea.  Aviators continued to fight for increased roles of carrier based 
aircraft, from increasing carrier based strikes in Vietnam, to debates with the Air Force 
regarding nuclear weapons deployment throughout the Cold War.  Just as for years naval 
                                                 
65 Halperin and Clapp, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 26. 
66 Ibid., 27. 
67 George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power (Standford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1993), 213.  
18 
officers held fast to Mahan’s vision of ships of the line, the aviation community has 
resisted efforts to reduce its role in maritime strategy.  Forward presence and operations 
from the sea, are hallmarks of naval aviation.  In the same regard, surface forces also see 
themselves as indispensable elements of maritime strategy.  Cruisers and destroyers 
provide a cadre of combat capabilities ranging from air and surface defense to naval 
surface fire support and long range missile strikes ashore. 
 
C. BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS 
 
Bureaucratic politics theory, as proposed by Allison and Morton Halperin, treats 
the organizational output as the result of compromise and negotiation between competing 
organizations and their interests.68  Decisions, in this case the final maritime strategy, 
will be based on calculated negotiations over several competing actions or objectives, and 
not a singular rational calculation.  Even if they agree on the strategy, leaders will differ 
in how to achieve it because of such factors as organizational perspective, personal 
interests, and background.69  “Where you stand depends on where you sit.”70  Such a 
multi-person decision making process would intuitively lead to better decision and 
strategy making.  However, many more independent observers examining a problem can 
lead to “analysis paralysis.”71  The leaders from each community -- surface and aviation -
- act as players in the political strategy game, bringing their own experience to the 
strategy developing process.  Where the organizational behavior model puts emphasis on 
the collective output of the organization, i.e., the surface and aviation communities, 
bureaucratic politics goes further in explaining the decision making process by placing 
the emphasis on the individual players, not the developed routines of the organization.72  
Because the difficulty in using the bureaucratic politics model lies in the emphasis on the 
players in the political game, the solution to the maritime strategy will also reflect the fact 
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that officials are not exclusively focused on the strategic question at hand.  In addition to 
focusing on the strategic dilemma at hand, Navy officials are also required to take into 
account how decisions today will affect their communities tomorrow.   
Who contributes in this strategy development process?  Like the organizational 
behavior model, players in the bureaucratic politics model will come to the strategic 
development table predisposed with their organization’s missions, routines, and culture.  
But this does not guarantee their decisions play out along party lines.  The “Revolt of the 
Admirals” (1948-49) and the debate over the role of Naval aviation in national security 
highlights the role of individuals in the decision making process.  Then Secretary of 
Defense, Louis Johnson, disagreed with senior naval officers on the role of carrier based 
aviation.  “He understood that the country needed a Navy but, to his way of thinking, it 
should be a Navy that concentrated on its basic defensive tasks in light of its potential 
adversary, not one that used its varied capabilities for a whole range of offensive and 
defensive tasks.”73  He chose instead to focus on unifying naval aviation and the Army 
Air Force within the Department of Defense.  At the cancellation of the USS UNITED 
STATES by Johnson, the Secretary of the Navy, John Sullivan, immediately resigned in 
protest.  His successor, Francis Matthews, received the appointment, not to support the 
Navy but to support the greater transformation vision of the Secretary of Defense.  When 
called to testify before House Armed Service Committee on 13 October 1949, Admiral 
Louis Denfeld, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), laid out his case: 
Why do we need a strong Navy when any potential enemy has no navy 
[with which] to fight?  I read this in the press, but what is more disturbing, 
I hear it repeatedly in the councils of the Department of Defense.  As a 
result, there is a steady campaign to relegate the Navy to a convoy and 
antisubmarine service, on the ground that any probably enemy possesses 
only negligible fleet strength. This campaign results from a 
misunderstanding of the functions and capabilities of navies and from the 
erroneous principle of the self-sufficiency of air power…Fleets never in 
history met opposing fleets for any other purpose than to gain control of 
the sea – not as an end in itself, but so that national power could be 
exerted against the enemy.74 
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Until this time, Admiral Denfeld had never expressed opinions contrary to Department of 
Defense policies; his first dissenting opinion led to his forced resignation.  Denfeld’s 
defection caused one senior general to remark, “Personal relationships have gone to 
hell.”75                    
Today, in regards to Maritime Strategy, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) will 
appoint a committee of senior officers to begin looking at the strategy problem.  These 
officers, representing an inner circle of elite policy makers, are more often prone to 
“theoretical thinking”76 because they have greater freedom to go after their own agendas.  
This allows senior naval officials assigned to develop strategy to not only reexamine the 
CNO’s objectives, but also strategic objectives sent down by the National Command 
Authority.  Allison cites Richard Bett’s work, as he explores this phenomenon.  “There 
are differences between services, between branches of the same service, between 
different cliques within branches, between ‘Pentagon’ officers and those in the field.”77  
Gathering a large group of seasoned officers with similar organizational backgrounds and 
training, but with vastly different experiences, creates an environment where quality 
decisions are not necessarily made along organizational lines.  
As a player in the strategic process, a flag level officer’s position will be 
influenced by “national security interests, organizational interests, domestic interests, and 
personal interests.”78  Despite generally agreeing on basic aspects of maritime strategy 
(i.e. necessity for homeland defense, protecting global sea lanes of communication), 
individuals can disagree on how wide the scope and reach of specific issues regarding the 
strategy.  Feeding information to senior officials are mid-level officers (04-06 paygrade 
range) who represent an outer circle of “staffers.”  Their job is to create talking points for 
senior officials; in essence filling the gap between directives from higher authority and 
the strategic process.  From December 1948 until November 1949, Captain Arleigh 
Burke, a decorated World War II destroyerman, and his OP-23 staff filled this role.  “OP-
23 was to familiarize itself on all matters pertaining to unification; advise [the CNO] and 
keep him and other senior officers informed on all unifications matters…and be the 
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clearing house within the navy for unification matters.”79  This military bottom up 
approach relies on mid-grade officers who may or may not have the knowledge and 
experience in their background to properly frame the strategic issues.  Tension can also 
be observed at the lower levels, as the staff argues over exactly which positions and 
issues to push up to the senior officials.80  Interestingly, in this case, Captain Burke held 
the respect of surface and aviation officers alike; his superiors favored his analytical and 
problem solving skills when applied to major naval policies.81      
By increasing the number of qualified personnel examining the strategy dilemma, 
the CNO effectively avoids many of the problems that arise out of singularly focusing on 
an individual issue.  At the top, he is the leader exercising control over a collection of 
organizations (warfare communities) but even he must get those under him to accede to a 
consensus or risk having his orders misinterpreted or ignored.  Secretaries Johnson and 
Matthews counted on Admiral Denfeld’s support for their unification policies.  Halperin 
cites George Keenan when considering the uncertainty of orders: “policies can be 
correctly and effectively implemented only by people who understand the entire 
philosophy and world of thought of the person or persons who took the original 
decision.”82  Today, the CNO’s direction to explore strategic options may be vague 
enough to elicit questions as to how exactly he wants it carried out.  Senior officials may 
not be fully aware of the motives behind the CNO’s Maritime Strategy decision and why 
they were directed to redevelop it.  This can lead to difficulty in implementing decisions 
which align with the CNO’s vision.   
Additionally, the CNO may find that his vision for the Maritime Strategy meets 
with resistance.  “Participants still have different interests and still see different faces of 
an issue and have different stakes in it.”83  When presenting options to the top, officers 
within the bureaucracy find it easier to defeat the agendas of others than to pass their 
own.84  When the Navy lost funding for its flush deck carriers, the service attacked the 
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Army Air Force’s B-36 production and capabilities.  Today, by pursuing traditional 
combatants, surface warfare flag officers will simply downplay the need for aviation 
assets instead of pushing the expensive destroyers of the future.  If naval aviation does 
not need new F-22 fighters, then more money will be freed up for DD(X) and Littoral 
Combat Ship (LCS) funding.  In the absence of a consensus within the inner circle 
opponents may take advantage of these disagreements to promote what they feel is the 
right course of action.85  The only way for an organization to succeed is to convince 
others that what they want them to accomplish really mirrors their own agendas.  In 1949 
the Navy had to convince congress that Secretary Johnson’s diminished role for naval 
aviation went contrary to national defense.  This led to the resurrection of carrier 
procurement funds and the Navy’s role in air power.  Such “hauling and pulling,” will 
lead to a maritime strategy that reflects the compromises between aviation and surface 
objectives and priorities and possibly resist changes sought by the CNO.  Utilizing such a 
political lens to view the strategic process, it is hard to envision the resulting strategy 
being more evolved than a watered down version of a grander maritime strategy.  
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III. STORY OF A PROCESS: WHAT IS REALLY HAPPENING? 
A. TOP DOWN: THE CNO’S STRATEGIC VISION 
 
On 14 June 2006, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Mike Mullen, addressed 
the Current Strategy Forum at the Naval War College in Newport, RI.  During his 
remarks Admiral Mullen reflected on Secretary of the Navy John Lehman’s strategic 
vision during the Cold War, which Lehman outlined in a speech to the same War College 
forum twenty five years earlier.  “It was a watershed speech because it outlined in public 
a new set of ideas that guided the Navy for some time, a cornerstone strategy that set the 
Navy’s course on the long path to victory during those closing years of the Cold War.  It 
clearly defined the purpose of naval forces in that struggle … and articulated precisely 
how they would be used to deter and, if necessary, defeat the forces of the Soviet Union, 
first at sea and then ashore. ”86  Building on that strategic vision of the Cold War, 
Admiral Mullen challenged those in attendance to take a broader view of naval power in 
the strategic arena and to let go of the long held belief “that maritime strategy exists 
solely to fight and win wars at sea, and the rest will take care of itself.”87    
Out of the national security directives, Adm. Mullen selected several key points 
from which to launch the maritime strategy.  Among them are the defense of the 
homeland, prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 
prevention of a near peer competitor, and global interdependence through secure sea 
lanes of communication (SLOC).88  He refers to a "national fleet" comprising both the 
Navy and the Coast Guard, which has the small-boat expertise for dealing with littoral 
and fourth generation warfare threats. Mullen is also seeking unprecedented cooperation 
from foreign navies and even from some major merchant shipping companies. Together, 
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he says, like-minded navies could serve as a global "1,000-ship Navy"89 that could work 
jointly to keep the peace.  Accordingly, Mullen wants naval planners to focus not just on 
threats to the United States but also on the relationship between maritime security and the 
globalized economy.  The United States and its allies depend more than ever on sea lanes 
for the transportation of goods and resources.  For example, the United States takes more 
than 6 million cargo containers into its ports each year.  “And since most governments 
derive their legitimacy from economic stability, and most of the world’s commerce still 
travels by sea – some 90 percent – there remains a key role for navies and maritime 
security.  It is not by happenstance that our vision for the Navy includes the need to keep 
sea lanes open and free.”90  Admiral Mullen hopes that the economic globalization angle 
will entice foreign cooperation.   
 
B. CREATING STRATEGY 
 
What does the internal storyline and process look like according to the research? 
According to the Navy, the Maritime Strategy today is the key to achieving American sea 
power supremacy and a piece of a larger four-part structure.  This includes the Navy’s 
vision which is outlined in Sea Power 21.  Tactics, which are addressed in the Naval 
Operations Concept, dictate how resources will be utilized by the navy war fighter.  
Finally, with limited resources, the Navy Strategic Plan will provide the necessary 
guidance for policy makers in creating a budget for submission to Congress.  Since the 
vision, tactics, and resources are set, naval officials are supposed to see the new Maritime 
Strategy fulfilling their strategic naval goals.91   
Five phases were laid out to develop the maritime strategy in a memo from the 
Navy Office of Information:   
Phase I: Collect Inputs and Analyze Strategic Environment.  This begins 
the process and continues through all phases. 
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Phase II: Develop Maritime Strategies. Discuss strategic theories in public 
forums in order to socialize initial concepts. 
Phase III: Test, Examine and Refine Alternatives.  The Navy will 
legitimize and validate proposed strategies through the testing and gaming 
process and analysis of results. 
Phase IV: Synthesize and Report.  The Navy will synthesize successful 
strategies into one comprehensive strategy. 
Phase V: Sustainment.  The Navy will continue to promote and uphold 
principles of the Maritime Strategy, ensuring its enduring value and 
legitimacy.92    
Before strategic process could begin in earnest, the Naval War College set out to define 
and frame the geo-strategic environment and global trends which would influence naval 
operations in the next twenty years.  A conference convened in Newport, from 23-24 
August 2006, brought together military, academics, think-tanks, and industry leaders to 
discuss the global relationships between economics, energy, society and demographics, 
environment, government, technology, and security and law.  Several conclusions 
regarding the direction of the Maritime Strategy include the following: 
1. Any new strategy must encompass more than warfighting to remain 
relevant. 
2. Relationship between energy costs and operational deployments favors 
embedding forces rather conducting periodic exercises with other states to 
achieve 1000-ship navy. If global maritime cooperation is a good idea, and 
most participants agreed it was, and, if energy costs continue to rise, 
which most participants thought likely, then the most effective and 
efficient way to garner cooperation and save money is to embed a limited 
number of ships with select host navies. Otherwise exercise opportunities 
will be so limited as to make the notion of a 1,000-ship navy 
implausible.93 
Further guidance from the Admiral John Morgan, Deputy CNO Information, Plans & 
Strategy (N3/N5) at a Process Analysis Workshop on 30 August 2006 stated that a new 
maritime strategy needed to be linked to the current national strategic documents set forth 
by the White House and Pentagon, but that they should not be seen as “straight jackets” 
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for developing strategy.94  Additionally, every effort should be made to correlate the 
maritime strategy to “real intelligence” and take into account how it will relate to the 
“strategic, bureaucratic, intellectual, budgetary” context in which it will be utilized.95  
Shortly after the geo-strategic environment was defined, the Maritime Strategy 
Red Executive Group convened on 7 September 2006 in Newport, RI to begin work on 
their charter to “shape, scope and critique the overall Red analytical effort throughout the 
Maritime Strategy development process.”96  The group identified seven strategic 
challenges to the new maritime strategy and ranked them in order of priority.  They 
include, China, a radical Salafist movement, an Iran-backed Shia movement, Pakistan, 
North Korea, Russia, and, India.97  The strategic objectives of these entities will be used 
to war-game every aspect of the maritime strategy options developed during the strategic 
development process.     
 
C. A CONVERSATION WITH THE COUNTRY 
 
The five step process was intended to use a “linear and collaborative approach” to 
collect inputs from various individuals and groups around the country.  Coined, a 
“conversation with the country,” eight Maritime Strategy Seminars were planned 
throughout the United States to allow for as wide a sampling of ideas as possible.  Target 
audiences included opinion leaders, local, state and federal government, business, 
industry, academia, and media. 
The “Conversations” were set up as a one day strategic forum to encourage a 
competition of ideas regarding maritime strategy.  The author attended the conference 
held on March 12, 2007 at the Marine Memorial Hotel in San Francisco, California.  Vice 
Admiral John Morgan (N3/N5) opened the conference by framing the Navy’s strategic 
                                                 
94  Deputy CNO Information, Plans & Strategy, "The New Maritime Strategy: An in-Progress 
Review," Department of the Navy, http://www.nwc.navy.mil/cnws/marstrat/docs/research/Sep_11_n-
3_MARSTRAT_Brief.ppt (accessed June 10, 2007), slide 22. 
95 Ibid.   
96 M. A. Neville, “New Maritime Strategy Red Executive Group - 7 September 2006 Meeting Report,” 
(Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2006), 
http://www.nwc.navy.mil/cnws/marstrat/docs/research/RED_EXECUTIVE_GROUP_REPORT.doc  
(accessed June 10, 2007), 1.  
97 Ibid., 2-3. 
27 
search through the Conversations, Sea Power 21, and the Maritime Strategy as the ends, 
ways, and means, respectively.  Admiral Morgan also emphasized that globalization had 
led to economic integration and stressed the importance of the “economics of the 
oceans.”  To provide a historical framework for those in attendance, Professor Walling, 
from the Naval War College, laid out the past dialogue that has consumed the Maritime 
Strategy debate: building a “moat” for homeland defense versus power projection in 
order to secure free use of the commons.  Next, Peter Swartz, Chairman of the Global 
Business Network, presented his work on “The Art of the Long View” and our need to 
challenge “mental maps.”  After an entire morning of lectures and Power Point 
presentations, the afternoon featured a brief interactive conversation about maritime 
strategy.  Keypads were set up for individuals at the conference to rate his/her perceived 
importance of a particular issue regarding maritime strategy; a brief discussion of 
opinions followed each question.  “The results cannot be used in any scientific way. But 
they can provide useful insight for Navy officials seeking to figure out how to tell the 
Navy story to policy makers and taxpayers who may wonder why, while the nation is 
engaged in a ground war, the Defense Department should spend $130 billion a year on 
the sea service.”98  A few key statistics regarding the group in attendance:  
• 87% were male 
• 57% were over the age of 61 
• 13% were on active duty 
• 27% were in defense related private sector fields 
Question one asked the audience to rate the importance of forward deployed naval 
forces versus a force geared toward homeland defense.  Eighty-three percent (83%) 
favored forward deployment; one percent (1%) favored homeland defense; the rest sat in 
the middle ground.  Reasons given centered on taking the fight to the enemy away from 
American shores.  Homeland defense does not guarantee freedom of the seas.  Building a 
“moat” with maritime forces created a line too easily penetrated; references were made to 
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France’s Maginot Line of the early 20th century.  Those in the middle favored forward 
deployed forces but cautioned against leaving the proverbial back door unguarded.  Some 
even wondered if the question was a false dichotomy.  Would America look favorably on 
a foreign Navy forward deployed to the coastline of the United States? 
The second question asked the audience to rate the importance and role of 
alliances in a new maritime strategy.  Seventy-seven percent (77%) favored a strong role 
for alliances.  Most opinions felt that the United States did not have the manpower or the 
constitution to go it alone for a long duration.  Those in the middle ground pointed out 
that the U.S. needs to be careful which countries it aligns itself with; there is always the 
possibility of being drawn into unwanted conflicts that do not benefit the U.S.  There is 
also a difference between an alliance and a coalition.  Alliances seem to be critical to the 
Navy’s “1000 Ship” vision, but some brought up the question, “what if they do not 
show?” Others wondered how we get a “1000 ship navy” to agree to the same objectives.   
The third question of the conversation pitted control of the commons against 
expeditionary power projection from the sea.  Twenty-eight percent (28%) of those 
polled leaned toward overall control of the commons, with fifty percent (50%) preferring 
power projection from the sea.  The remaining thirty-two percent (32%) held the middle 
ground on the issue.  Those in favor of control of the global commons believed that 
power projection only remained useful for short tactical engagements.  Some also 
questioned whether expeditionary power had gotten the United States into trouble in the 
past. 
Concluding the discussion VADM Morgan called for the American people to own 
the maritime strategy.  If the strategy did not have the support of America at large, then it 
would not be successful.  He cited the importance of those present at the conversations 
around the country taking the debate back to their own circles.         
 
D. THE MARITIME STRATEGY OPTIONS 
 
Out of the strategic process, three Maritime Strategy Options (MSO) have 
emerged for final testing and validation.  Constant variables for all three MSO’s are the 
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national security objectives which remain true to ADM Mullen’s original four tenets99 
and geo-political assumptions.  The geo-political assumptions include the following: 
1. Global commons (sea, space, cyberspace) remain important for U.S. 
national security and economic well-being. 
2. Not all threats to the United States are strategic. 
3. China’s relative importance in global politics will increase because of 
economic and military growth. 
 a.  China is not necessarily a U.S. adversary. 
 b.  China is a credible potential peer competitor.   
4. Terrorists will pose an infrequent but potentially spectacular threat to 
U.S. homeland. 
5. Access to Persian Gulf energy resources is essential for global 
economy. 
6. Hostile or competitive strategic actors will develop asymmetric ways 
to counter U.S. conventional force. 
7. States will seek WMD advantage against regional threats and/or to 
neutralize U.S. military advantages. 
8. U.S. maritime forces will maintain a strategic deterrence capability.100 
Varying among the three MSO’s are the “maritime strategic concepts, supporting logic, 
maritime mission areas enabling capabilities/concepts, and regional implementation.”101  
 Option One would preserve “winning combat power forward,” enabling the Navy 
to prevail on short notice and take “preemptive or preventative action as necessary.”  
MSO One aims to defeat aggression and overcome anti-access and area-denial strategies 
from the sea while focusing primarily on the zone from the Persian Gulf to Northeast 
Asia.  This option, which would maximize combat power, sees China as the main 
candidate to become a near-peer or peer competitor to the United States.  Option one sees 
terrorism as a “less frequent but more spectacular” threat that allows terrorists the 
opportunity to utilize the seas to access the United States.  Unfriendly states will seek 
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weapons of mass destruction and regional instability will endanger Persian Gulf energy 
supplies.  This approach places emphasis on seabasing, missile defense and blunt sea 
strike offensives.102 
Option Two concentrates on securing the global maritime commons.  Maritime 
forces would focus on missions involving core competencies, ensuring sea control and 
countering sea denial.  To implement this concept, cooperation and flexibility would be 
needed.  MSO Two stresses working with allied navies, increasing awareness of activities 
close to foreign shores and the ability of other nations to assure their own maritime 
security.  The second option concedes that United States’ forces no longer assume 
command of the seas in all situations in all parts of the world.  The United States’ sea 
control capabilities are diminishing and new technological, political and legal ways of 
contesting sea control have come into view.   However, MSO Two holds that U.S. 
maritime forces need to maintain the ability to counter sea denial threats.  Option Two 
pushes for greater joint interoperability between the services in maritime domain 
awareness and maritime security operations, ballistic missile defense, and homeland 
security.103 
  MSO Three endeavors to prevent future great power wars, which can drastically 
“disrupt the global system that supports U.S. security and prosperity.”  Maritime forces 
would keep the peace and deter major wars by maintaining a forward deployed combat 
power.  This option also considers China the most likely near-peer and focuses on this 
“‘high end’ conflict in order to demonstrate power and resolve.”  This option also aims to 
prevent local and regional conflicts from escalating, while building relationships 
internationally through “culturally aware shaping operations and enhanced commitment 
to ‘low end’ operations.”  The interests of the United States are best served by supporting 
the current global system.  Great powers can be drawn into regional conflicts in bids for 
resources or influence and the rise of challengers to the dominant national economy has 
also sparked war between great powers.  MSO Three advocates stronger declaratory 
nuclear policy as well as continued development of missile defense.  This option also  
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focuses more on low-end operations to counter terrorist activities, WMD traffic and 
transnational crime.  Maritime domain awareness and seabasing are among the priorities 
emphasized.104 
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IV. MATCHING THEORY WITH REALITY 
A. OBSERVATIONS ON THE PROCESS 
 
After laying out the organizational behavior and bureaucratic politics models and 
then looking at how the process unfolded, one can now begin to deconstruct the creation 
and execution of maritime strategy for the United States Navy.  Since Admiral Mullen 
threw down the strategy gauntlet to the Naval War College in June 2006, debates have 
been ongoing within the Department of the Navy regarding its direction and purpose.  
However, strategic debates have not followed the service community lines originally 
proposed in this thesis.  Surface warfare officers and aviators have not squared off to 
battle for destroyers and littoral combat ships in favor of F/A 18 Super Hornets and 
carriers.  While debates do exists regarding the future battle line of the Navy, the issue at 
hand is not surface versus aviation.  In fact, naval aviation and surface support have 
become synonymous with forward presence and power projection.  Cemented in the 313- 
ship fleet proposed by Admiral Mullen are eleven aircraft carriers (or carrier strike 
groups) and supporting air wings.  Multi-mission (i.e. guided missile destroyers) vs. 
single mission (i.e. littoral combat ship) surface platforms are still vying for funding and 
prominence in strategic planning, however, whatever support landed will complement 
naval aviation and the projection of combat power forward.105  Multi-mission platforms 
excel at blue water operations while single mission hulls would be better suited to the 
littorals.   
At first glance it would appear that the models failed to predict the three output 
options which are being analyzed by Vice Admiral Morgan’s N3/N5 staff.  But the 
models show interesting results when viewing the strategic process in context with the 
larger national strategic guidelines.  By re-writing the Maritime Strategy, the Navy as an 
organization is interpreting the objectives and policies from the Department of Defense  
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in its own terms.  As indicated though the strategy process, regardless of warfare 
designation, the participants are focused on maintaining maritime dominance in the 
consciousness of national security.   
Paul Bracken argues that what made the Navy’s strategic process unique to 
strategy at the national level was a refusal to jump to immediate strategy at the outset of 
the exercise.  The maritime strategy process started without the answer to the security 
problem.106  Whether or not naval leaders professed to have a clear picture of the output 
(in the form of maritime strategy) in the beginning, much of the details in the three 
options are not groundbreaking.  The Navy may have stated a desire to approach the 
maritime strategy problem and process without an ultimate strategy in mind, but the 
author argues that the strategy options outlined in Chapter Three are predictable given the 
Navy’s strategic culture and the organizational models.    
This chapter reviews the three maritime strategy responses.107  What these three 
options detail is a classic look at the strategic culture through the organizational and 
bureaucratic politics lenses.  Borrowing from Roger Barnett, the shared and enduring 
characteristics of naval culture are:  
• Maintaining a systems approach 
• Recognizing the primacy of context 
• Performing in an expeditionary manner: offensive, forward, mobile, and 
joint 
• Ensuring Adaptability 
• Accounting for inherent uncertainty and risk108 
These organizational characteristics are common to the leadership and communities 
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B. APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM 
 
Unlike the United States Army, naval strategists are prone to think in a systems 
approach.  Instead of agonizing over organizational charts referring to exactly which 
units are supplying which forces, naval commanders are more concerned with air 
defense, logistics, and strike systems.109  All three of the Maritime Strategy Options were 
developed by examining the security environment from a holistic and systematic point of 
view.  Naval officials broke the problem down, setting up a plan of action and milestones 
(POAM) to outline the strategic process.  Organizationally, the Navy had many standard 
operating procedures for examining the strategic process in this manner.  Naval planners 
analyzed the security environment; they looked at past strategies; they analyzed possible 
foreign responses and war-gamed those responses to flesh out problems.  A large part of 
the systematic approach was creating debates about sea power from San Diego to 
Newport through the “Conversations with the Country” with the hopes of exposing 
dissenting or alternative options.   
By looking at the process through the “conversations” and the organizational 
models, an explanation of reinterpreting national grand strategy can be seen.  “Few would 
argue that such a conversation would be unproductive; any deliberate, inclusive, and truly 
open dialogue about maritime strategy will be sure to yield positive results, even if they 
are nothing more than a restatement of the value of maritime power to the United 
States.”110  More than simply updating the Maritime strategy, naval officials hope to 
thrust the importance and relevance of the Navy in the twenty-first century.  A look again 
at the statistical breakdown of the San Francisco ‘Conversation’ illustrates this point: 
57% were over the age of 61; 13% were on active duty; 27% were in defense related 
private sector fields.  It was the author’s observation that these were people who already 
have some idea of the capability and importance of sea power.  They were average people 
who may, but most likely had no strategy related experience.  By seeking out people who 
shared its organizational essence, naval officials practically guarantee that when action is 
                                                 
109 Barnett, Strategic Culture and its Relationship to Naval Strategy, 27-28. 
110  Robert O. Work, ""Economics" and Established Maritime Powers: Resource Implications of the 
New Maritime Strategy," Economics and Maritime Strategy: Implications for the 21st Century (Newport, 
RI: Naval War College, November 2006). 
36 
recommended or taken it will often reflect the specific organizational priorities.  They 
even brought out Peter Swartz and his work on “The Art of the Long View” and the need 
to challenge “mental maps.”  However, once it came time to “get out of the box” and talk 
strategy, every question asked put the audience, and their individual points of view, back 
into it.  For example, when opening the conference, the initial presenter, Professor 
Walling, went out of his way to frame homeland defense as “building a moat” and a less 
than desirable option.  It is no surprise then, that in the afternoon, eighty-three percent 
(83%) of those polled favored a strategy based on forward deployed forces.  Vice 
Admiral Morgan even commented that the real challenge was to get the American public 
to own the maritime strategy.  He has also stated, “I think there is a diversity of opinion 
and we’re all shaped by our own experiences.  That is healthy and informative.”111  But 
his real goal and take-home message was for every participant to take the debate back to 
their inner circles and continue the “conversation.”  This is really what the 
“Conversations” have been about: reminding the American public that they still need 
maritime forces, which will cost money.    
Despite eclipsing $623 billion in fiscal year 2007,112 the Department of Defense 
budget accounts for only roughly four percent of the national GDP and resources are 
tightly controlled.  Organizationally, naval objectives reflect efforts which are not to lose 
ground to sister services in importance and relevance, especially when it comes to 
funding.  This relationship, between maritime strategy and resources is not 
groundbreaking.  Samuel P. Huntington explores it in a 1954 issue of United States Naval 
Institute Proceedings: 
 The second element of a military service is the resources, human and 
material, which are required to implement its strategic concept.  To secure 
these resources it is necessary for society to forego the alternative uses to 
which the resources might be put and to acquiesce in their allocation to the 
military service.  Thus the resources which a service is able to obtain in a 
democratic society are a function of the public support for that service.   
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The service has the responsibility to develop the necessary support and it 
can only do so if it possesses a strategy concept which clearly formulates 
its relationship to the national security.113 
By reconstituting the maritime strategy, naval officials hope to influence civilian 
leadership not only in budget talks but also in future national security strategy forums.  In 
fact, this philosophy is plainly stated in the “Developing Maritime Strategy” talking 
points on the Navy Office of Information website: “We see the new Maritime Strategy, 
which should be released in about a year, influencing the next cycle of strategic thinking, 
including the next Navy Strategic Plan and into the next QDR.”114  Here, there is no 
revolutionizing of naval strategy as in the transition to carrier-centric battle groups in 
World War II and the fight for naval aviation, simply a goal of shaping future national 
strategy through a status quo and increase in funding.         
 
C. PRIMACY OF CONTEXT 
 
The “Conversations” illustrated part of Navy’s strategic process, which then leads 
to the context of the maritime strategy.  Instead of strictly aligning strategy with national 
defense objectives, the Navy is attempting to preempt the next administration by 
entrenching its own strategic vision.  The strategic culture of the Navy is indicative of the 
military, its civilian oversight and the institutions which are responsible for grand 
strategy.  While rational theory holds that each level of strategy, from the President down 
to Service Chiefs, should complement one another, the organizational and bureaucratic 
politics models show something different.  “Each level of strategy making has its own set 
of requirements and constraints, resulting from the nature of the system, thereby creating 
the possibility for contradictions and disjunctions.”115  It might take several versions of 
maritime strategy to meet the national grand strategy if it is “ambiguous or insufficient to 
make a clear delineation as to how to proceed.”116  When crafting the National Security 
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strategies the framers miss the fact that the “American Way of War” is greatly 
mismatched with the strategic environment of globalization and asymmetric threats 
which they themselves defined.  As Colin Gray explains: 
American public, strategic, and military culture is not friendly to the 
means and methods necessary for the waging of warfare against irregular 
enemies.  The traditional American way of war was developed to defeat 
regular enemies.  It reflects many of the strengths of American society and 
culture.  Alas, one military style does not suit all kinds of warfare equally 
well. The fit between the traditional “American way,” and the 
requirements of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, for example, 
falls far short of perfect.117 
Following the Cold War, America flexed its newfound hegemonic power, using the 
overwhelming might of military force to solve almost any problem it encounter on the 
international scene.   
In Clausewitzian terms, if the use of force is simply policy by other means, then 
the end state and objectives need to be clearly defined.  In the American bureaucratic 
system, with administrations changing every four or eight years, strategy must be easily 
adaptable.  With the 2001 and 2006 Quadrennial Defense Reviews, the civilian policy 
makers outlined their perceived potential threats to U.S. national security  which 
encompassed four different types of threats: (1) traditional challenges involving military 
engagements with other nation states; (2) irregular challenges involving confrontations 
with enemy combatants outside military forces from non-state actors; (3) catastrophic 
challenges involving threats of weapons of mass destruction; and (4) disruptive 
challenges involving both state and non-state actors trying to tip the scale of U.S. 
hegemony.118  It was then left to the Department of Defense and the respective service 
branches to develop the strategy to defeat the threats.  At the same time as directives were 
filtering down from the President, to the Secretary of Defense, to the Chief of Naval 
Operations, the military has been in the middle of two major combat operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  So, as the military is being directed to alter its strategy to fit the 
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changing security environment, it finds itself right in the middle of an irregular war for 
which it has no strategy.  If the terms are not sufficiently defined by the leadership from 
the outset, then it is next to impossible for the military to learn and adapt.  What follows 
is failed or minimal transformation and poor strategy.    
As part of this process, by developing maritime strategy, the CNO embarked the 
Navy on an “adaptive planning process” aimed at mitigating the risks inherent in “ad hoc 
planning,” or the rational top-down approach.  “If I’m inclined to believe in anything, I’m 
inclined to believe in agility and adaptability and resilience,” stated Vice Admiral 
Morgan, in an interview with Inside the Navy.119  If the Navy relies on strategy created 
only from guidance handed down from higher authority, then it is limited in its response 
“to what the future may actually hold for Navy’s interests and only provide traceability of 
Navy risk decisions to [Department of Defense]-level risk guidance.”120  In framing the 
maritime strategy process both Admirals Mullin and Morgan illustrate the “theoretical 
thinking” of bureaucratic politics.  Navy hierarchy generally agrees with the tenets of 
national security directives but has to go beyond them.  Governmental administrations 
come and go while the military institutions follow a more constant and structured path.  
To placate the directions from the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the 
Joints Chiefs of Staff, the initial naval strategic response does not look to new 
innovations, but simply repackages old and existing technology and assets to maintain 
status quo within the Department of Defense.  With this type of response, is the Navy 
holding onto the “American way of war” when it should be adapting?    
With phrases like “joint operations” and “continuous transformation,” and terms 
like “mobility” and “expeditionary” littered throughout national strategy documents, the 
question remains, is the Navy responding to the changing security environment and 
demands from civilian authorities?  Since September 11, 2001 the Navy has cited its 
participation in numerous operations in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).  Officials 
cite medical and construction support for forces on the scene in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
long range surveillance of suspected terrorists by ships and aircraft, maritime interception 
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operations (MIO), direct action missions by special operations forces (SEALs), 
tomahawk missile strikes against terrorist targets, and increased cooperation with the 
United States Coast Guard to enhance overall maritime domain awareness (MDA), as 
vital contributions to the GWOT.121  Since the Quadrennial Defense Review in 2006, the 
Navy has continued to expand its presence in the GWOT.  Initiatives such as the “1,000-
ship Navy,” Global Fleet Stations (GFS), the acquisition of the first littoral combat ships 
(LCS) and a riverine force add to the Navy’s capabilities in supporting the GWOT.  The 
Navy has also assumed command of the Horn of Africa joint task force, the detainee 
operation at Guantanamo, Cuba, various prisons in Iraq, and defense of the Haditha Dam 
and the offshore oil terminals in Iraq.122  The Department of the Navy contends that 
“[t]hese operations support our nation’s interest[s]…There are over 12,000 sailors ashore 
(including Individual Augmentees supporting ground forces in core mission areas and 
new capability areas) and 17,000 at sea in the U.S. Central Command region alone 
engaged in the GWOT.”123  But is this increased role in the GWOT necessary and are 
these really organizational changes that are appropriate?  They essentially are on the 
surface.  The Navy has responded to the call for change in order to preserve their 
organizational essence, but have failed to adequately address how it plans to fight the 
new threats in irregular conflicts of globalization and defeat a near peer.  By adapting to 
civilian calls for change, while at the same time pursuing their own maritime strategy, the 
Navy leaders are simply playing the “hauling and pulling” game of bureaucratic politics.  
Because the strategic culture and process cannot predict the future, the process postulates 
multiple futures and multiple force designs, selecting those characteristics most robust for 
the best force design and examining optimal strategies for achieving them.  The Navy 
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D. NO ESCAPING FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS 
 
Each of the three Maritime Strategy Options reviewed relies on the traditional 
hallmark of naval missions: a concentration on forward deployed forces.  As stated 
before, naval forces are not garrison forces; ships are meant to put to sea.  With such a 
long history of forward presence operations, it will be next to impossible to get the Navy 
to alter the organizational mindset of maintaining forward deployed forces and the 
country may not want it to change.  History shows that the Navy, as an arm of the 
Department of Defense, has a sporadic record of homeland defense and security 
operations.  These types of defensive operations do not stick: America, and especially the 
Navy, enjoys playing the “away game,” preferring strategy which takes the fight to the 
enemy.  Following the Cold War, a small sect of Americans believed in a foreign policy 
favoring isolationism and avoiding armed conflict.  Forward presence operations won out 
when the U.S. realized how intertwined its economy was in the fast paced world of 
globalization.  Ships already at sea can easily be redeployed elsewhere, particularly if 
they are supported by afloat logistics forces.            
Expeditionary forces are important to MSO One which would preserve “winning 
combat power forward,” enabling the Navy to prevail on short notice and take 
“preemptive or preventative action as necessary.”  Naval forces will act in a preemptive 
or preventative manner, relying less on deterrence and more on unilateral or multilateral 
combat power to secure national interests.  MSO Three endeavors to prevent future great 
power wars, which can drastically “disrupt the global system that supports U.S. security 
and prosperity.”  Here, maritime forces would keep the peace and deter major wars by 
maintaining a forward deployed combat power.  Both One and Three, see China as the 
main candidate to become a near-peer or peer competitor to the United States.  Simply 
having forces available for power projection is not enough; on the heels of the Cold War, 
the Navy has been on the lookout for the next great naval threat.  The problem with China 
becoming a near peer is explained by economist Albert Keidel:   
Even if China came close to spending annually what the U.S. does on 
military activities and procurement, it would take China many decades to 
accumulate the stock of aircraft carrier task forces, command and control 
installations, space-based platforms, and other combinations of hardware, 
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software, and talent that reflect many decades of U.S. high-quality 
expenditure and accumulation, especially when one considers the U.S. 
accumulation of basing rights around the world.  These are generally not 
for sale.  China’s economic prowess at mid-century may help it acquire 
bases and basing rights in strategic locations, but it would take a long time 
for that process to begin to match the U.S. global presence.124 
China, and for that matter, the seventeen national navies behind the U.S. do not even 
come close to operating a fleet comparable in aggregate tonnage.  The 2.85 million ton 
U.S. fleets dwarfs the combined 2.66 million tons of the next seventeen countries.125  
Despite the China/near-peer argument, naval strategy has to concentrate on emphasizing 
that the major military threat to national security will come from abroad, and thus it must 
be ready.  MSO One aims to defeat aggression and overcome anti-access and area-denial 
strategies from the sea while focusing primarily on the zone from the Persian Gulf to 
Northeast Asia.   
 
E. INNOVATION AND THE 1000-SHIP NAVY 
 
Perhaps the most innovative and questionable portion of the three strategy options 
is the execution of Admiral Michael Mullen’s “1000-ship Navy.”  Despite enjoying an 
unheard of hegemonic power over the global commons, policing it will require 
substantially more capability than the United States can deliver. "Where the old 'Maritime 
Strategy' focused on sea control," Admiral Mullen said last year, "the new one must 
recognize that the economic tide of all nations rises not when the seas are controlled by 
one [nation], but rather when they are made safe and free for all."126  It will take a 
combination of national, international, and private-industry cooperation to provide the 
platforms, people, and protocols necessary to secure the seas against transnational threats.  
In effect, the 1,000-ship Navy is about the voluntary development of a network that  
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vastly increases the number of sensors available to maintain Maritime Domain 
Awareness (MDA) and at the same time increasing the number of responders capable of 
enforcing security.   
The challenge is for individual nations to come together by determining where 
their national interests intersect and to determine what contribution they can make to this 
already-emerging network to meet those common interests.  This is a call for a global 
partnership unheard of for the United States.  Traditional American alliances, such as 
NATO, are exclusive rather than inclusive alliances of support.  Option Two concentrates 
on securing the global maritime commons, focusing on missions involving core 
competencies, ensuring sea control and countering sea denial.  Instead of operating multi 
or unilaterally, in order to implement this concept cooperation and flexibility would be 
needed.  MSO Two stresses working with allied navies, increasing awareness of activities 
close to foreign shores and the ability of other nations to assure their own maritime 
security.  This is not a call for a thousand U.S. hulled fleet, as in the Reagan era maritime 
strategy.  The second option concedes that United States’ forces no longer assume 
command of the seas in all situations in all parts of the world.  The United States’ sea 
control capabilities are diminishing and new technological, political and legal ways of 
contesting sea control have come into view.   
However, MSO Two holds that U.S. maritime forces need to maintain the ability 
to counter sea denial threats.  As an extension of the 1,000 ship navy, Admiral Mullen 
has introduced the Global Fleet Stations concept to build relationships and support 
forward presence in countries around the globe.  This innovation to maritime strategy is 
being pushed hard by Admiral Mullen.  An individual player in the strategic process, his 
experiences and ideas are reflected in the 1,000-ship Navy.  “The peculiar preferences 
and stands of individual players can have a significant effect on [strategic] action.”127  If 
someone else were CNO and calling for a new maritime strategy, such a global 
partnership of maritime forces may not have come about.  At the same time, as Admiral 
Mullen turns over the top sailor position to Admiral Garry Roughead, the incoming 
officer may not put the same value on the 1000-ship Navy as his predecessor.  His career 
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experiences may have led to different priorities for the Navy than Admiral Mullen’s, and 
his new position now affords him the opportunity to pursue them.  But, organizationally, 
“individuals in sub-organizations are trained, rewarded, and promoted according to a 
particular way of doing business.  Those socialized and promoted by the organization to  
do things in a particular way, will in their turn, apply the same criteria to their 
subordinates.”128  Therefore, in this regard, Admiral Roughead would likely continue to 
promote the 1000-ship Navy.     
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45 
V. CONCLUSION: STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS 
A.  THE NEW MARITIME STRATEGY 
 
Maritime and grand strategy have been portrayed in this thesis as a chain of 
political-military means and ends.  Historical decisions are often used to determine 
whether choices today are going to mirror the choices of the past.  The organizational 
behavior and bureaucratic politics models have proven useful in analyzing both the 
choices of the past and predicting the outputs of today and to some degree with the new 
Maritime Strategy.  Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, attempts at new maritime 
strategy have failed to grab the attention of many outside those who wrote them.  In 
calling for the new maritime strategy last summer, Admiral Mullen stayed true to the 
basic principles of Admiral Vern Clarke’s strategic contribution, Sea Power 21, while at 
the same time repackaging it to meet what he saw as the maritime needs of the twenty-
first century.  
Throughout the research for this thesis the author has been concerned with the 
past attempts at maritime strategy, the Navy’s process for developing strategy, and the 
possible options produced by that process.  On October 17, 2007 at the International 
Seapower Symposium held at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. Admiral Gary 
Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, General James Conway, Marine Corps 
Commandant, and Admiral Thad Allen, Coast Guard Commandant unveiled the output 
from the year-and-a-half long strategy process, A Cooperative Strategy for Twenty-first 
Century Sea Power.  On the surface it is a departure from the heavy-handed offensive 
based strategy of the 1980s.  In keeping with previous maritime strategies, some missions 
have not change (primarily maintaining open sea lanes of communication), but the new 
strategy shifts from a narrow focus on sea combat toward one that also emphasizes the 
use of "soft power" to counter terrorism and deliver humanitarian assistance, hallmarks of 
Admiral Mullen’s 1000-ship vision.  
The Strategy opens by restating the Navy’s perceived objectives from the national 
strategy documents.  As a subset of national grand strategy, maritime strategy influences 
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a whole gambit of national interests.  As this thesis has tried to demonstrate, grand 
strategy provides the overarching direction of power to achieve national goals, and below 
it the maritime strategy influences national power at sea.  The new strategy then departs 
from the national strategic guidance in stating that “maritime forces will be employed to 
build confidence and trust among nations through collective security efforts that focus on 
common threats and mutual interest in a multi-polar world.”129  The claim that the United 
States is operating in a multi-polar world is the first instance in the strategic vision by the 
administration and military leaders that the U.S. has an equal in the world.  Led by 
current President George W. Bush, the American civil/military bureaucracy has thrust the 
country into adopting a path of global primacy.  This idea is alluded to in the National 
Security Strategy and explicitly stated in the National Defense Strategy: “We will have 
no global peer competitor and will remain unmatched in traditional military 
capability…Though we have no global peer, we will have competitors and enemies – 
state and non-state.”130  If anything, these previous and higher authority documents call 
for the United States to maintain and expand its global hegemonic status in a uni-polar 
world.  This illustrates a disconnect between the Navy and civilian authorities’ view of 
the security environment and the Navy’s inability to firmly set itself within the context of 
national strategy.  As Barry Posen explains, “Interpreting the external environment is the 
specialty of civilians.  Building and operating military forces is the task of services.”131  
The new Maritime Strategy fails to adequately describe the force structure necessary to 
succeed in either security environment or to adequately relay its proposed relationship to 
national grand strategy.     
While the U.S. Navy fills a subset role in American national strategy, it does not 
fulfill the nation’s maritime security needs alone.  The new Maritime Strategy represents 
the first time that the Navy, the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard have collaborated on a 
single, common strategy for defending the U.S. homeland and protecting U.S. interests 
overseas.  Additionally, maritime strategy involves numerous other aspects of national                                                  
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power other than military power.  Diplomacy, preservation of economic trade routes and 
sea lanes of communication, coastal and littoral defense, border security, and anti-sea 
denial concerns both regional and worldwide are just several of the issues maritime 
strategy must incorporate.  “No one nation has the resources required to provide safety 
and security throughout the entire maritime domain.  Increasingly, governments, non-
government organizations, international organizations, and the private sector will form 
partnerships of common interest to counter these emerging threats.”132  Understanding 
these various issues will aid the United States in making policy decisions which take into 
account that not every country shares the same interests and strategies in maritime affairs.   
Shortly after the terrorist attacks in New York City on September 11, 2001, naval 
forces conducted strike and combat missions against Taliban targets in Afghanistan.  
Operation Enduring Freedom became a textbook maneuver from the sea operation.  The 
USS PELELIU and USS BATAAN Amphibious Ready Groups deployed marines into 
the heart of Afghanistan over 450 miles inland from the Arabian Sea.  Two years later, 
power projected from the sea would continue as the Navy took part in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.  The year 2003 saw U.S. naval forces committed to maintaining open sea lanes 
of communication for military logistics and commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf.  
The following is a short list of the Navy’s accomplishments during Operation Iraqi 
Freedom: 
• During OIF, more than 50 percent of [the naval] force was forward 
deployed. The deployment of seven Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) and 
eight large deck amphibious ships proved our ability to be both a surge 
and a rotational force demonstrating our flexibility and responsiveness. 
 
• Navy and Marine Corps aircraft flew more than 8000 sorties and 
delivered nearly 9000 precision-guided munitions. 
 
• Over 800 Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired from 35 coalition 
ships, one-third of which were launched from submarines. The highest 
number of TLAM’s launched in one day occurred on March 21, 2003 
– nearly 400 Tomahawks. 
 
• Navy Special Forces, MCM, EOD and coalition counterparts cleared 
more than 900 square miles of water, ensuring the safe passage of 
critical humanitarian relief supplies to the Iraqi people. 
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• Marines from the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), supported by 
Sea Basing concepts, made one of the swiftest combat advances in 
history. They fought 10 major engagements, destroying nine Iraqi 
divisions in the 450 mile advance into Iraq. 
 
• Eleven Maritime Prepositioned Force (MPF) ships provided 
equipment and sustainment for over 34,000 Marines and Sailors and 
fourteen amphibious ships embarked and delivered another 12,000 
Marines and Sailors and their equipment.133 
Operation Iraqi Freedom did nothing to reverse or reexamine the direction naval 
strategy was moving.  Battles at sea continued to be replaced by missions from 
the sea.         
The new maritime strategy effectively captures the strategy and operations which 
the Navy has been conducting afloat since before September 11, 2001 without setting a 
new strategic direction - save the focused maritime integration between the Navy, Marine 
Corps, and Coast Guard - but rather maintaining its preferred course.  There are six 
strategic objectives (referred to as “imperatives”), six capabilities, and three strategic 
priorities listed in the new strategy.  The six strategic imperatives include the traditional 
missions of concentrating major combat forces in the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean and 
Western Pacific to deter or fight potential conflicts.  Protecting vital sea lanes represents 
a growing priority, it states, as seaborne trade has more than quadrupled over the last four 
decades and now accounts for ninety percent of all international commerce and two-
thirds of global petroleum trade.  In addition, the strategy calls for dispersing smaller 
maritime teams to carry out humanitarian as well as counter terrorism missions, weapons 
proliferation, piracy and other illicit maritime activities – in order to contain threats 
before they can reach the United States.  These teams, which would integrate Navy, 
Marine Corps and Coast Guard forces, would deploy to areas such as Africa and the 
Western Hemisphere to promote closer cooperation with maritime forces in other 
nations.134   
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For the most part, the public and many government agencies do not see or know 
how the Navy performs these tasks.  The six capabilities to implementing the strategic 
objectives include: forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime 
security, and humanitarian assistance and disaster response.135  These capabilities 
amount to the basic organizational standard operating procedures of the U.S. Navy.  
Throughout its history, the Navy has developed a preferred way of conducting the 
business of naval warfare and maritime security.  Each warfare community in the Navy 
owns a personal and professional stake in maintaining the status quo of strategic and 
operational capabilities.  It is no surprise then that the objectives and the capabilities to 
implement them have not changed significantly in the new maritime strategy.  The 
individuals who created the document were trained and promoted within an 
organizational system which conditioned them to apply the organizational mindset and 
essence to the strategic process.   
Overall the new maritime strategy represents a failed opportunity on the part of 
senior naval leadership.  Those involved in the process were no doubt the best and 
brightest, and their hard work should not be overlooked.  However, this document reflects 
the strategy development process for exactly what it is: the product of group think and 
bureaucratic compromise.  There is no attempt to address specific enemies such as China, 
North Korea, or Iran.  The three preliminary Maritime Strategy Options focused on 
specific adversaries, just as Lehman’s strategy focused on the Soviet Union.  The old 
strategy targeted the Soviet Union and outlined pre-planned responses to scenarios.  The 
new Maritime Strategy reads more like the product of an unsure security environment.  
How long will the U.S. enjoy hegemonic power? Is it in decline?  These are questions the 
new Maritime Strategy implies no one knows the answers to.  With a specific shift away 
from blue water engagements, the new strategy consolidates 1990s’ strategic thinking in 
operations “from the sea” projected ashore.  The output here does little more than attempt 
to once again sell the country on why it needs a navy.  Why did the Navy fail at 
transformation and strategic innovation?       
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B. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS, AND 
TRANSFORMATION 
 
When applied to the maritime strategy process, organizational behavior theory 
explains the strategic preferences and operational behavior of the Navy.  It does so by 
focusing on the capabilities and limitations of organizations and the decisions they are 
prone to make without direction from higher leadership.  The research cites little  
organizational debate between the surface and aviation communities within the Navy in 
the context of the maritime strategy process.  However, naval aviation enjoys a 
preponderance of support fleet wide in executing the maritime strategy in the last twenty 
years.  The organizational model was useful in examining the process from start to finish 
and predicting the traditional, stagnant strategy which resulted.  When looking at the 
process, the Navy was left to its own devices to interpret and twist national grand strategy 
to suit its own organizational essence – both to preserve and to expand its political 
influence.  In adding its own interpretation on the security environment contrary to 
national directives, the Navy certainly adhered to the organizational principles of eluding 
civilian direction in favor of its own priorities and preferred capabilities.  According to 
organizational behavior, this should have been seen as outside the Navy’s capabilities.     
Bureaucratic politics theory also proved useful in examining the process when 
looking at the roles of individual players and their necessary roles in the political game.  
Change and innovation only come as a result of heavy-handed leadership from the top.  
The national grand strategy had this in the transformational ideas of the Secretary of 
Defense, Donald Rumsfeld and the Quadrennial Defense Review.  The maritime strategy 
received guidance and leadership from Admiral Mike Mullen.  His vision for strategic 
innovation came in the form of the 1000-ship Navy, a concept he pushed down on the 
Navy and through active campaigning at two international maritime conferences.  “At the 
Mediterranean Regional Seapower Symposium in Venice and at the Western Pacific 
Naval Symposium in Pearl Harbor, he told his contemporaries that it was time to ‘move 
beyond dialogue’ and to ‘take tangible steps’ that would ‘put these powerful ideas to 
work at sea.’”136   
                                                 
136 Ronald E. Ratcliff, “Building Partners’ Capacity: The Thousand Ship Navy”, Newport Papers 29: 
Shaping the Security Environment, ed. Derek S. Reveron, (Newport, RI: Naval War College, August 2007).  
51 
This thesis has argued the military has more intellectual stability than is found in 
the top civilian echelons of the government, yet the Navy’s own bureaucratic politics 
could deemphasize its own strategic direction.  There is no convincing evidence that 
either side is right in its strategic process and direction.  Instead, both are products of the 
civil-military relationship which has been long established in this country.  “Resistance to 
change is a natural tendency of both humans and large organizations, but in a world 
characterized by accelerating change, it is a strategic liability…The world is moving very 
rapidly – and the Department of Defense is too attached to the past…[It] brings to the 
fore the struggle of each officer to find that balance between loyalty to service and 
devotion to the larger needs of the nation.”137  The Navy, and by extension the military, 
may have more stability in the long run, but civilians set the strategy: therein lies the 
disconnect.  “Different bureaucracies command different types of expertise.”138  It's not 
for the military to make foreign policy decisions, however, how is the military machine 
suppose to react when its strategic direction is shifted every, two, four or eight years?  
Why is it so important for the Navy to come to grips with its strategic vision?  Unlike the 
other services, the platforms which comprise much of the fleet are expensive, have long 
life-cycles, take years to construct, and are increasingly difficult to modify once new 
applications and missions are discovered.  Since the fall of its Cold War rival, the U.S. 
Navy has found it increasingly difficult to impact the national and global security 
environments with short term solutions to transformation.  Following the development of 
the new Maritime Strategy, the fleet continues to operate a blue water, open ocean force 
in a littoral, green-to-brown water arena.  The organizational behavior and bureaucratic 
politics models  show how the Navy has struggled with the problems of a constantly 
changing security environment and national security directives, while deploying a fleet 
designed to fight an enemy long gone and creating a fleet for an enemy which exists over 
the horizon.       
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